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Abstract
The paper discusses questions resulting from a study of the interaction
of exogenous shocks and environmental policy. In a model with pollution
as a side eﬀect of consumption environmental policy is introduced in the
form of a consumption tax with or without a subsidy on eco-friendly
investments. In simulations we observe the dynamic behavior of models
before and after sudden changes of exogenous variables. These shocks are
jumps in productivity or a sudden depreciation of capital. Additionally we
examine the eﬀect of a simultaneous appearance of both types of shocks.
Furthermore we investigate the consequences of a lagged reaction of the
policy agents.
1
1 Introduction
Undeniably, the preservation of global and local ecosystems is not only of es-
sential importance for present but also for future generations. Nevertheless, in
economics environmental policy is usually evaluated in static models. Excep-
tions can be found in the literature on the interaction between environmental
policy and economic growth. Seminal studies were published by Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1997), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996), Forster (1973), Gradus
and Smulders (1993), Huang and Cai (1994), Lighthart and van der Ploeg (1994)
and Smulders and Gradus (1996). Conrad (1999) summarizes the literature on
computable general equilibrium models.
Bohm and Russell (1985) discuss among other criteria the flexibility and dy-
namic incentives of policy instruments. Flexibility is considered as the facility
to adjust the chosen environmental policy instrument to changes of exogenous
variables if a certain environmental target level is to be reached. Dynamic incen-
tives of policy instruments are eﬀects on the development of new technologies,
on the impact on relative factor prices and their consequences on locational
decisions.
In this paper, we focus on the aspect of flexibility. Using the model de-
veloped in Barthel (2005) we explore the consequences of exogenous shocks on
the economy. In steady state equilibrium models, variables remain constant or
change with a (common) constant rate over time (see Chiang (1984), p. 499).
Here we investigate the consequences of a jump in productivity. Typically, inno-
vations in an economy do not cause a jump in productivity since the diﬀusion of
innovations usually takes time. The reason is that fundamental innovations cre-
ated by basic research have to be "translated" into secondary innovations that
bring about realizations of possibilities rather than new opportunities. There-
fore, changes in productivity in reality are sequences of innovations on several
levels.1 Even fundamental innovations such as the steam engine, the transistor
or integrated circuits took years - sometimes even decades - to become part of
everyday life. What we have in mind are events that change the business envi-
ronment "overnight". Examples are the German Unification or the enlargement
of the European Union. Here, suddenly new technologies became available for
all enterprises of the respective country. The resulting jump in productivity
is often accompanied by an abrupt depreciation of the country’s capital stock.
This can be a sectoral problem, if only a small number of industries face an in-
tensified competition, or a general problem, if out-dated capital vintages become
ineﬃcient in the whole economy. Of course, a sudden depreciation of a country’s
capital can also occur without productivity shocks. It can be the consequence
of a change in regulation that simply makes the use of certain technologies -
and therefore certain types of capital - illegal or ineﬃcient.2 A thinkable reason
1 Innovations in real life always have fundamental as well as secondary attributes. For a
discussion see Aghion and Howitt (1998).
2Although the acceptance of instruments that complete the set of markets is increasing, in
past and present direct regulation seems the most popular instrument among politicians (see
Bohm and Russell (1985), p. 436).
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for the ban of technologies is the appearance of evidence about risks or adverse
eﬀects of these technologies.3 On the other hand free trade agreements may also
lead to an abrupt disappearance of those industries that were formerly protected
by trade barriers.
In such tumultuous times, environmental concerns are often brushed aside.
For this reason we analyze the consequences of a lag in the adjustment of envi-
ronmental policy instruments to the new exogenous conditions.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the
basic model. Section (3) discusses the impact of shocks in models with and
without environmental policy. Section (4) addresses the eﬀect of an abrupt
capital depreciation. In Section (5), productivity shocks are accompanied by
a sudden depreciation of capital. Section (6) investigates the consequences of
a delayed adjustment of the environmental policy after a shock. Section (7)
summarizes the results and gives a brief outlook on possible extensions and
variations of the model.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Environment
The environmental quality N (t) depends only on the flow of pollution. There
is no accumulation of pollutants. It is assumed that all pollutants that are
not eliminated due to environmental protection vanish in the next moment.
This is equal to a situation with infinite but somewhat lagged self-regenerating
capacity of the environment. Examples of pollutants of this type are traﬃc
noise, malodor from thinners or other chemical substances and - sometimes -
food, and last but not least cigarettes and cigars, especially those produced
in Cuba, notably Havana.4 The burden on the environment depends on the
share of income devoted to cleaning the environment E (S), in the following
refered to as "environmental expenditures". Pollution is a damaging side eﬀect
of consumption P (C). Without economic activity the environmental quality is
N . It follows:
N = N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
with:
NE > 0 NP < 0
2.2 Households and Preferences
The representative household exhibits preferences over consumption goods and
environmental amenities. Population growth is zero. The rate of time preference
3Blatant examples are the widely use of heroine as pain killer and antitussive as well as
in the treatment of abstinence phenomenon after opium and morphine abuse or the use of
thalidomide in the treatment of morning sickness. The American prohibition (1919-1932)
made a whole industry illegal.
4We ignore that especially cigars cause stench for days if you cannot open the window.
Permanent smoking can make a room unusable for years.
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is ρ. The elasticity of substitution, σ, and the relative weight of environmental
amenities in utility, φ > 0, are constant. The utility function of the individual
household can be written as:
Wi =
Z ∞
0
U (ci, N, φ) · e−ρ·tdt (1)
with the household’s consumption being ci and the environmental quality N .
It is assumed that all n households are identical, especially of equal size,
and small. For the average consumption and investment into the regenerative
capacity of the environment follows:
C =
nX
i=1
ci c =
C
n
S(N) =
nX
i=1
s(N)i s(N) =
S(N)
n
Households supply one unit of labor and receive a wage w. Each household holds
assets a with a rate of return r. Part of the household’s income can be invested
“into the nature” to improve the regenerative capacity of the environment. This
investment could be thought of as something like trash collection for which one
has to pay or as engagement in environmental activities. The endogenous rate
of these investments is s(N). The remaining income can be used for consumption
c and saving a˙. The flow budget constraint for the household is:
w + r · a = a˙+ c+ s(N) (2)
The household’s optimization problem is to maximize (1), subject to the
budget constraint (2). As derived in Appendix 8.1, the control variables change
according to:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· ρ− r
c
(3)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· ρ− r
s
(4)
with
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢ · n
+UcN · PC ·NP · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡
(UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS ·NE + UNN ·E2S ·N2E + UN ·E2S ·NEE
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
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For the change in environmental quality we can write:
N˙ = NE ·ES · S˙ +NP · PC · C˙ (5)
= n · (NE ·ES · s˙+NP · PC · c˙)
2.3 Production
The production technology in this economy can be described by a linear-homogenous
production function with labor L and capital K in eﬃciency units.
Y = F (K,L) (6)
Since each of the n households supplies one unit of labor and owns the same
share of the total capital stock, K, it follows:
Y = F (K,n) = n · F
µ
K
n
, 1
¶
k ≡ K
L
f (k) ≡ F (k, 1)
Output per capita can be expressed by:
y ≡ Y
n
= f (k)
The marginal productivities are then given by:
∂Y
∂K
= n · ∂f (k)
∂k
· 1
n
=
∂f (k)
∂k
∂Y
∂L
= f (k) + n · ∂f (k)
∂k
· ∂k
∂n
= f (k)− K
n
· ∂f (k)
∂k
Output is equal to the sum of the marginal factor productivities multiplied by
the quantities:
Y =
∂Y
∂K
·K + ∂Y
∂L
· L
=
∂f (k)
∂Kn
·K +
∙
f (k)− K
n
· ∂f (k)
∂k
¸
· n
= f (k) · n
In equilibrium, supply and demand on the capital and on the labor market are
equal. This results in factor payments equal to marginal productivities:
r =
∂Y
∂K
=
∂f (k)
∂k
w =
∂Y
∂L
= f (k)− k · ∂f (k)
∂k
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Equilibrium on the capital market ensures that savings are equal to investments.
The total capital stock equals the total amount of assets:
a · n = K
Consequently,the interest rate is equal to the marginal return on investment;
the wage rate is equal to the output per capita net of capital costs:
r =
∂f (a)
∂a
w = f (a)− a · ∂f (a)
∂a
Therefore, the wage and the interest rate in equilibrium only depend on the size
of the capital stock. The household’s budget constraint can be written as:
a˙+ c+ s(N) = f (a)
2.4 Steady State
In this model - with no other engine of growth than capital accumulation - a
steady state is characterized by constant variables. It follows:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ρ− r = 0
ρ = r (7)
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a)
Uc
UN
= NE ·ES −NP · PC (8)
a˙ = 0
c+ s(N) = w + r · a = f (a) (9)
For given parameter values, these equations allow to compute solutions for the
steady state values c∗, s∗ and a∗.
2.5 The Optimal Solution and a First-Best Policy
As a benchmark we derive the optimal solution of the model.5 The benevolent
dictator considers the trade-oﬀs between higher consumption and consequential
increased pollution and between higher expenditures for environmental quality
resulting in lower consumption but higher environmental quality. The behavior
5See Appendix 8.2.
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of the system can be described by:
g(a) ≡
a˙
a
=
f (a)− c− s(N)
a
(10)
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ2 − ξ3
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· ρ− fa
c
(11)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ2 − ξ1
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· ρ− fa
s
(12)
with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
∙
UN ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UNN ·N2P · P 2C
¸
· n2 + 2 · UcN · PC ·NP · n
UN ·NE ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN + UNN ·NP · PC · n
UN
+
NEP · PC · n
NE
ξ3 ≡
µ
UNN ·NE ·ES
UN
+
NEE ·ES
NE
+
ESS
ES
¶
· n
The steady state of the optimal solution is characterized by:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ρ− fa = 0
ρ = fa (13)
Uc + UN ·NP · PC · n = UN ·NE ·ES · n = θ(a)
Uc
UN
= (NE ·ES −NP · PC) · n (14)
a˙ = 0
c+ s(N) = w + r · a = f (a) (15)
As a first-best policy we introduce a combination of consumption taxes d
and subsidies on environmental expenditures p that ensure the optimal level
of consumption and environmental expenditures in the steady state.6 As a
consequence, the optimal environmental quality and the maximal utility level
are reached. The budget constraint of household i is now given by:
wi + r · ai = (1 + d) · ci + (1− p) · s(N)i
The control variables change according to:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
(ξ5 − ξ2) · (ρ− r)− ξ3 · ξ5 · d˙+ ξ2 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
· 1
c
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
(ξ1 − ξ4) · (ρ− r) + ξ3 · ξ4 · d˙− ξ1 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
· 1
s
6 See Appendix 8.3.
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with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN ·
¡
NP · PCC +NPP · P 2C
¢ · n
+UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n+ UcN ·NP · PC · (n+ 1)
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡ −
1
1 + d
ξ4 ≡
(UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ5 ≡
¡
UN ·NE ·ESS + UNN ·N2E ·E2S + UN ·NEE ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ6 ≡
1
1− p
To run numerical simulations, we have to specify the general equations used
so far.
2.6 Specific Functions for Numerical Simulations
2.6.1 Utility Function
In the following we will concentrate on the case of an elasticity of substitution
equal to one (σ = 1) - the Cobb-Douglas utility function:7
U = cα · (φ ·N)1−α (16)
2.6.2 Environmental Quality
For simplicity, the following function is chosen to describe the environmental
quality :
N = N +E (S)− P (C) (17)
We assume for the impact of economic activities on environmental quality:
E (S) = τ (S) · Sγ (18)
P (C) = τ (C) · Cβ (19)
0 < γ < 1 < β
0 ≤ τ (S), τ (C)
7The impact of the elasticity of substitution is discussed in Barthel (2005).
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The relevant derivatives are:
ES = τ (S) · γ · Sγ−1 > 0 (20)
ESS = τ (S) · γ · (γ − 1) · Sγ−2 < 0 (21)
PC = τ (C) · β · Cβ−1 > 0 (22)
PCC = τ (C) · β · (β − 1) · Cβ−2 > 0 (23)
This implies decreasing marginal eﬀects of investments into environmental qual-
ity and increasing marginal damages due to consumption. Decreasing marginal
eﬀects of environmentally friendly expenditures are analogous to decreasing mar-
ginal productivities in production. Increasing marginal damages result from the
assumption of unfeasibility of life on earth if environmental quality is to low.
2.6.3 Production Function
We use a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = F (K,L) = A ·Kδ · L1−δ (24)
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the output per capita and the interest rate are given
by:
y = A · kδ
r = δ ·A · kδ−1
It follows that the unique equilibrium is determined by the parameters. The
equilibrium capital stock is given by:
k∗ =
µ
δ ·A
ρ
¶ 1
1−δ
The labor supply is one unit per head. In the economy there are n households.
This results in:
k = a
3 The Impact of Productivity Shocks
In the present chapter, we consider first the case of an unregulated market
economy. A second benchmark model deals with the solution of a benevo-
lent planner. Following that we compare the results with a model of a market
economy regulated with an environmental policy consisting of a combination of
consumption taxes and subsidies on environmentally friendly expenditures that
ensures an optimal expenditure structure. The following parameter values are
used: A = 5, n = 1000, α = 0.75, β = 1.1, γ = 0.9, δ = 0.5, ρ = 0.05, φ = 0.5,
9
N = 1000, τ (S) = 5 and τ (C) = 0.05.8 Various methods can be applied to find
correct initial values of the control variables.9 However, we use the method of
backward integration as described by Brunner and Strulik (2002). The trajecto-
ries correspond to a time path that approaches 99.5% of the equilibrium capital
stock in t = 0. Note that the dashed trajectories in the figures correspond to
the change of variables without shocks.
3.1 Numerical Results for an Unregulated Market Econ-
omy
In a first set of models we analyze the impact of a pure productivity shock. In
t = 0, the productivity level A jumps to 5.1, 5.25 or 5.5, which corresponds to
a change of 2%, 5% or 10%, respectively. The shocks are unanticipated, but
once productivity is on the new level the change and all of its consequences are
common knowledge. There is no stochastic element in the model. Consequently,
sensible formation of expectations is impossible.
Using the specific functions we can rewrite Condition (8) for the unregulated
economy in the following way:
Uc = UN · (ES + PC)
It follows:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc − UN · PCC · n− UcN · PC · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C · n
UN ·ES
ξ2 ≡
(UcN − UNN · PC) · n
UN
ξ3 ≡
UcN − UNN · PC · n
UN
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS + UNN ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·ES
The path of the system is now determined by the equations:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ3 · ξ2
· ρ− r
c
(25)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· ρ− r
s
(26)
g(a) ≡
a˙
a
=
f (a)− c− s(N)
a
(27)
The following figures illustrate the behavior of the system in case of a pro-
ductivity shock of 2% in t = 0.
8A rate of time preference of ρ = 0.05 results in equilibrium in an interest rate of r = 0.05.
This corresponds to period length of one year. The other parameter values are more or less
arbitrarily chosen provided that they fulfill the conditions mentioned above and result in a
model that can be solved numerically in reasonable time.
9For an overview, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), pp. 471-491.
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Figure 3.1: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: assets, consumption,
environmental expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 3.2: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: growth rates of assets,
consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 3.3: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: wage rate, interest rate,
relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
Due to the shock, the equilibrium asset level increases. This increases the
opportunity costs of consumption and environmental expenditures. Therefore,
growth rates of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures jump up-
ward, whereas the level of consumption, of environmental expenditures, and
consequently the utility level, drop down. Wage rate and capital income in-
crease due to the productivity shock at 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The
following table shows the size of these immediate eﬀects for a number of other
relevant variables in relation to the productivity shock.
Table 3.1: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a pro-
ductivity shock
∆A ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
+2 −5.9801 −7.4453 −5.3828 −5.8311
+5 −14.4212 −17.7732 −13.0364 −14.0771
+10 −27.1454 −32.9057 −24.7117 −26.5445
The consequence of a productivity shock is a shift in all equilibrium variable
values except for the growth rates.10 The percentage change of environmental
expenditures is higher than that of all other variables (see Table 3.2). This gen-
eral result is observed in all models of this study and is reflected in the highest
jump of the associated growth rate. It results from the decreasing marginal
eﬀectivity of these expenditures (see Equation 21). The households try to com-
pensate this eﬀect. Furthermore, more consumption implies more pollution. It
10 In equilibrium, all growth rates are equal to zero.
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is therefore not surprising that the increase in environmental quality is smaller
than the relative change of all other variables.
The households lower expenditures to attain the new equilibrium capital
stock. This implies increased growth rates. As a consequence of a productivity
shock of 2%, 5% and 10%, the growth rate of the capital stock jumps in t = 0
from 0.103% to 0.908%, 2.063% and 3.846%, respectively. After 15 periods, the
capital stock approaches 99.794%, 99.519% and 99.062% of its new equilibrium
value, respectively.
Table 3.2: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a productivity shock in t = 0 in an unregulated economy
∆A ∆a∗ ∆c∗ ∆s∗ ∆N∗ ∆U∗
+2 +4.040 +3.955 +4.978 +3.544 +3.852
+5 +10.250 +10.027 +12.703 +8.960 +9.759
+10 +21.000 +20.520 +26.278 +18.256 +19.950
3.2 Numerical Results for a Planned Economy
Now we look at the eﬀects of the same type of shocks but in a planned econ-
omy.11 Note that the benevolent dictator does not anticipate the productivity
shocks. But his immediate reaction puts the economy on the new long-run op-
timal path. The following figures illustrate the consequences of a productivity
shock of 2% for the relevant variables.
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Figure 3.4: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: assets, consumption,
environmental expenditures and environmental quality
11See Appendix 8.2 for the specification of the equations of motion for the state and control
variables.
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Figure 3.5: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: growth rates of assets,
consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 3.6: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: wage rate, interest rate,
relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
As one would expect, the planned economy is characterized by a diﬀerent
structure of the household expenditures. Compared to the unregulated economy,
consumption is lower. Due to the higher environmental expenditures and lower
pollution as a consequence of lower consumption environmental quality is much
higher. This over-compensates the eﬀect of lower consumption on utility so that
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utility in the planned economy is higher.
Following a productivity shock, the growth rates of assets and consumption
are higher in a planned economy. This results in a higher speed of conver-
gence; all variables including the wage and the interest rate approach to their
equilibrium values faster than an unregulated economy.
Table 3.3: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a pro-
ductivity shock in a planned economy
∆A ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
+2 −6.396 −6.851 −5.872 −6.265
+5 −15.406 −16.444 −14.200 −15.106
+10 −28.941 −30.709 −26.848 −28.423
In t = 0, the relative change of consumption is slightly higher and the rela-
tive change of environmental expenditures slightly lower than in an unregulated
economy. In absolute terms the initial loss in consumption is higher in the unreg-
ulated economy. Without regulation, consumption decreases at about 13.534,
32.637 and 61.435 units due to a productivity shock of 2%, 5% and 10%, re-
spectively. The initial reductions in consumption prescribed by a planner are
10.982, 26.453 and 49.695 units, respectively. The environmental expenditures
decrease in an unregulated economy at about 1.526, 3.642 and 6.744 units; in a
planned economy at 5.136, 12.327 and 23.021 units, respectively.
Table 3.4: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a productivity shock in t = 0 in a planned economy
∆A ∆a∗ ∆c∗ ∆s∗ ∆N∗ ∆U∗
+2 +4.040 +3.949 +4.248 +3.611 +3.865
+5 +10.250 +10.013 +10.793 +9.134 +9.792
+10 +21.000 +20.490 +22.167 +18.621 +20.020
3.3 Numerical Results for an Optimal Environmental Pol-
icy
In the present model environmental policy has to internalize two external ef-
fects: the negative eﬀect of pollution due to consumption and the positive eﬀect
of environmental expenditures. This can easily be done by a combination of
instruments. Furthermore, it is possible to calculate consumption tax rates and
subsidies on environmental expenditures that guarantee a balanced governmen-
tal budget in equilibrium by varying the size of the budget. To keep things
simple we assume constant tax and subsidy rates.12 That implies the possibil-
12The ideal first-best policy in this dynamic model is simply unrealistic. It would imply
a permanent adjustment of tax and subsidy rates whenever the economy is oﬀ the steady
state equilibrium. An alternative to the combination of instruments that we look at here is
a constant tax rate with subsidies depending on the momentary tax revenue. Theoretically,
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ity of a budget surplus or deficit in the short run. In the long run, the budget
is balanced.
In this section we assume that tax rates and subsidies change immediately
after the productivity shock. After the shock a larger capital stock is optimal.
It follows that the external eﬀects become more important: higher consumption
leads to more pollution.
Compared with the solution in an unregulated economy, here in the optimal
solution the equilibrium value of consumption is lower; environmental expendi-
tures, environmental quality and the utility level are higher. In the following
table, equilibrium levels of variables in the unregulated economy and an econ-
omy with optimal environmental policy are compared.
Table 3.5: Equilibrium values of variables of the reference model
(no shock) and following a productivity shock in t = 0
∆A a c s N U
0% 2500.000 229.181 20.819 141.617 170.866
unregulated 2% 2601.000 238.244 21.856 146.635 177.447
economy 5% 2756.250 252.161 23.464 154.306 187.541
10% 3025.000 276.210 26.290 167.470 204.954
0% 2500.000 173.973 76.027 95476.0 708.072
optimal 2% 2601.000 180.844 79.256 98923.7 735.436
policy 5% 2756.250 191.392 84.232 104197 777.409
10% 3025.000 209.620 92.880 113255 849.829
It is interesting that the necessary change of tax and subsidy rates after
the productivity shock is comparatively small. A productivity shock of 2%,
5% and 10% should be accompanied by an increase of the tax rate of 0.287%,
0.709% and 1.392% as well as by an increase of the subsidy rate of 0.0000035%,
0.0000097% and 0.0000215%, respectively. Consequently, the utility gain due
to a change in the regulation is also unspectacular; it amounts to 0.0000071%,
0.0000438%, 0.000170%, respectively. This is completely diﬀerent from the huge
gains resulting from the introduction of regulation as we can see in Table 3.5.
The initial reaction after the productivity shock is illustrated in Table 3.6.
As in the unregulated economy, the values of the control variables consumption
and environmental expenditures fall considerably. Compared with the unregu-
lated economy, this decrease is more substantial (see Table 3.1). Consequently,
environmental quality and the utility level decrease whereas all growth rates
and savings increase.
the budget of the government would be balanced both in the long and in the short run. But
given that policy there exists a set of initial points consistent with the first order conditions
without trajectories to the equilibrium. As a consequence, corner solutions of the optimization
problem have to be considered. For the sake of simplicity we abandon a deeper discussion of
this problem.
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Table 3.6: Percentage change of variables following a productivity
shock in t = 0 in the case of an optimal environmental policy
∆A ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
+2 −9.144 −9.562 −8.143 −8.895
+5 −21.625 −22.543 −19.419 −21.078
+10 −39.390 −40.854 −35.842 −38.522
The increase in savings results in increased growth rates. Following the pro-
ductivity shock of 2%, 5% and 10%, the growth rate of the capital stock is
1.238%, 2.764% and 5.012%, respectively. After 15 periods, the capital stock
approaches 99.935%, 99.847% and 99.694% of its new equilibrium value, respec-
tively.
In a comparison of table 3.6. with variable values for the unregulated (Table
3.1) and planned (Table 3.3) economy it is noticeable that the initial decrease
of total expenditures - and following that the decrease in environmental quality
and utility - is higher in a planned economy than in an unregulated market.
Furthermore, it is higher with an optimal policy than in a planned economy.
Simultaneously, the speed of convergence is low in an unregulated economy
and higher with an optimal policy than in a planned economy.13 The planned
economy converges faster than the unregulated economy since external eﬀects
are internalized - the positive externality of less consumption today on the utility
level of other persons tomorrow are taken into account. The optimal policy leads
to a faster reaction of the economy than the direct regulation by a planner since
oﬀ equilibrium the tax rates are not optimal - they are too high if consumption
is lower than its equilibrium value. That implies that consumption will be lower
than in a planned economy, savings are higher and consequently so is the speed
of convergence. But - as mentioned above - a permanent adjustment of tax and
subsidy rates would cause prohibitively high transaction costs. Therefore, the
scenario considered here seems to be more realistic.14
Table 3.7 shows the impact of a productivity shock on equilibrium levels of
various variables. Since the equilibrium level of capital is determined by exoge-
nous parameters, its change is exactly the same as in an unregulated economy
(see Table 3.2). The changes of the other variables are similar to the changes
calculated for the unregulated economy. The change of the level of consumption
and the environmental expenditures are slightly smaller than in the models of
the unregulated market, reflecting most notably diﬀerent base values. Never-
13Here we understand speed of convergence as the possibility to close a gap between an
initial value and a target level of a certain variable, i.e., in our case capital stock. The easiest
way to evaluate the speed of convergence is by a comparison of growth rates: relatively high
growth rates in the beginning and low growth rates at the end of the considered period indicate
a high speed of convergence, provided that the variable converges at all.
14 In the real world taxes are raised at some predetermined dates (see e.g. the German
energy tax). This is something completely diﬀerent, as it is no adjustment to real world data.
In fact it is an attempt to give the individuals and firms the possibility to adjust their behavior
in response to the expected change of the tax. The stepwise introduction of a tax is primarily
a way to lower transaction costs.
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theless, in the optimal policy case the increase of environmental quality and
utility level is in spite of an elevated base value higher than in the unregulated
market.
Table 3.7: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a productivity shock in t = 0 in the case of an optimal en-
vironmental policy
∆A ∆a∗ ∆c∗ ∆s∗ ∆N∗ ∆U∗
+2 +4.040 +3.949 +4.248 +3.611 +3.865
+5 +10.250 +10.013 +10.793 +9.134 +9.792
+10 +21.000 +20.490 +22.167 +18.621 +20.020
The impact of the internalization of the two external eﬀects is shown in Table
3.8. Despite the decrease of consumption the utility level increases dramatically.
This is mainly a consequence of the increase of environmental expenditures
which leads to an enormous change in the environmental quality. There is no
significant diﬀerence contingent on the size of the productivity shock.
Table 3.8: Equilibrium values of variables with optimal policy in
percentage of values in an unregulated economy
∆A c s N U
+2% 75.907 362.628 67462.5 414.454
+5% 75.901 358.984 67526.2 414.527
+10% 75.892 353.290 67627.0 414.644
The following figures show the graphs for various variables before and after
a productivity shock. The dashed line indicates the behavior of the system
without a shock.
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Figure 3.7: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: assets, consumption,
environmental expenditures and environmental quality with an optimal policy
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Figure 3.8: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: growth rates of assets,
consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level with an
optimal policy
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Figure 3.9: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income with an optimal policy
As mentioned above, tax and subsidy rates are calculated so as to keep the
government’s budget balanced in equilibrium. Although in the case of∆A = 2%
the budget surplus jumps from 0.070 to 0.570 in t = 0, this surplus is negligible
compared to the overall tax revenue falling from 74.668 to 68.036 at the same
time. The jump results from diﬀerent magnitudes of change of consumption
and environmental expenditures in t = 0. Since environmental expenditures
decrease relatively more, tax revenues fall less than subsidies. The following
figure displays the government’s budget cash flow over time.
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Figure 3.10: Productivity shock of 2% in t = 0: budget cash flow
In Table 3.9 we compare tax revenues (T ), subsidies (S) and the budget cash
flow (B) over 30 periods as well as the consequences of the sudden change in
t = 0 in absolute terms.
Table 3.9: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
and change after shock in absolute values
∆A|t=0
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B ∆T |t=0 ∆S|t=0 ∆B|t=0
2% 2050.91 2038.80 13.108 −6.633 −7.133 0.500
5% 2069.73 2054.92 14.818 −15.733 −16.817 1.084
10% 2100.91 2081.93 18.981 −28.783 −30.477 1.694
Since the decrease in tax revenues in t = 0 due to lower consumption is
accompanied by an even bigger decrease in subsidies due to lower environmental
expenditures the budget is always nearly balanced. Over time, the budget
surplus is less than 1% of the tax revenue.
4 The Sudden Impact of Capital Depreciation
A second type of shock is a sudden capital depreciation. Again we assume that
this shock is unanticipated and that there is no sensible way to form expecta-
tions. One example for such a shock is the German reunification. Although it
took roughly a year from the opening of the Berlin Wall to the oﬃcial unifica-
tion, the economic eﬀects came faster. With a look at the average life cycle of
physical capital it was virtually an overnight loss of capital.15 Other examples
15 In the former German Democratic Republic the lifespan of physical capital was a bit longer
than in western countries. The author had vocational training with technology developed right
21
are bans of certain technolgies due to a change of attitudes toward their use or
the consumption of their products. Catchwords in this context are: mad cow
disease, nuclear power, bird flu, thalidomide, fur, stem-cell treatment, sizeable
angled windows in airplanes etc. Most of these examples do not have measur-
able consequences for a whole country’s economy but can influence the welfare
of regions if they are specialized in certain industries. A last set of examples are
catastrophes and wars.
In the following we analyze the consequences of a loss of capital of about
10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% at t = 0 in an economy with and without an
optimal environmental policy. As in the previous section, at this point of time
the pre-shock capital stock attains 99.5% of its equilibrium level. The loss
does not influence the equilibrium values of the economy. Therefore a change
in environmental policy is not necessary. The following table illustrates the
percentage change of relevant economic variables in t = 0. Note that as a
consequence of the Cobb-Douglas production function and other specifications
in our model the change in production per capita equals the change of the wage
rate (∆y = ∆w).
Table 4.1: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 after capital
depreciation
∆a ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U ∆w ∆r
−10 −23.852 −29.043 −21.673 −23.314 −5.1317 +5.409
unregulated −20 −44.951 −53.072 −41.389 −44.081 −10.557 +11.803
economy −30 −62.889 −71.914 −58.731 −61.890 −16.334 +19.523
−40 −77.223 −85.531 −73.178 −76.273 −22.540 +29.099
−50 −87.542 −94.151 −84.107 −86.760 −29.289 +41.421
−10 −30.779 −32.185 −28.038 −30.104 −5.141 +5.420
optimal −20 −55.745 −57.740 −51.765 −54.782 −10.566 +11.815
policy −30 −74.719 −76.686 −70.757 −73.782 −16.342 +19.535
−40 −87.711 −89.282 −84.637 −87.006 −22.548 +29.112
−50 −95.226 −96.304 −93.361 −94.816 −29.296 +41.435
−10 −24.830 −26.396 −22.987 −24.373 −5.131 +5.409
planned −20 −46.714 −49.138 −43.766 −45.992 −10.557 +11.803
economy −30 −65.222 −67.866 −61.894 −64.418 −16.334 +19.523
−40 −79.895 −82.249 −76.855 −79.052 −22.540 +29.099
−50 −90.345 −92.098 −88.091 −89.825 −29.289 +41.421
after the war - World War I. And it was not training for a job in a museum, but instead in
telecommunication!
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Figure 4.1: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: assets, consumption,
environmental expenditures and environmental quality with an optimal policy
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Figure 4.2: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: growth rates of assets,
consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level with an
optimal policy
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Figure 4.3: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: wage rate, interest rate,
relation between wage and interest rate and capital income with an optimal
policy
-15 -10 -5 5 10 15
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.2
1.4
budget
Figure 4.4: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: budget cash flow with an
optimal environmental policy
With an optimal policy we can observe the most prominent decrease of
consumption and environmental expenditures. Consequently, the relative fall of
the utility level is dramatic: a depreciation of 50% of the capital stock reduces
utility to 5.184% of the original level. On the other hand, in this model the
24
convergence rates are higher than in the other models. After a 20% depreciation,
the capital stock reaches in t = 15 99.637% with an optimal policy, 99.078% in
a planned economy and 98.915% in an unregulated market of the equilibrium
value.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the budget cash flow if the capital depreciation is 50%.
After t = 0 the budget cash flow increases. The reason is - compared with
consumption - a more heavy decrease of environmental expenditures, reflected
also in the higher growth rate g(s) in t = 0. Therefore, in the beginning tax
revenues increase faster than expenditures for subsidies. After some time, the
higher growth rate g(s) results in a catch up of the environmental expenditures.
Again, in the long run the budget cash flow approaches zero.
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Figure 4.5: Capital depreciation of 50% in t = 0: budget cash flow
Although tax revenues and subsidy expenditures decrease with a higher cap-
ital depreciation the aggregated budget cash flow increases. The reason is again
the faster and more prominent decrease of the environmental expenditures. Con-
trary to the results with productivity shocks in these models the change of the
budget cash flow in t = 0 decreases if the degree of the distortion - here depre-
ciation - increases (except for the case of a 10% depreciation). This is also a
consequence of the relatively heavy decline of environmental expenditures (see
Table 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
and change after a capital depreciation in absolute values
∆a|t=0
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B ∆T |t=0 ∆S|t=0 ∆B|t=0
−10% 1957.02 1942.60 14.424 −22.998 −24.026 1.029
−20% 1866.74 1848.71 18.036 −41.652 −43.104 1.452
−30% 1774.01 1753.19 20.821 −55.829 −57.247 1.418
−40% 1677.93 1655.12 22.802 −65.536 −66.650 1.114
−50% 1577.13 1553.08 24.049 −71.151 −71.892 0.741
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Figure 4.6: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: assets, consumption,
environmental expenditures and environmental quality in a planned economy
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Figure 4.7: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: growth rates of assets,
consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level in a planned
economy
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Figure 4.8: Capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0: wage rate, interest rate,
relation between wage and interest rate and capital income in a planned
economy
In comparison with the unregulated market the planned economy approaches
its equilibrium values faster. Consequently, the growth rates of assets and re-
lated variables (consumption, production etc.) are higher in t = 0. The solu-
tion of the planner diﬀers from the market solution reached in an unregulated
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economy especially in that the decrease of consumption and environmental ex-
penditures are more alike.
5 Double Impact: Productivity Shock and Sud-
den Capital Depreciation
In this section we analyze the combined eﬀect of productivity shocks of diﬀerent
sizes and a simultaneous depreciation of capital. Overnight, 20% of the exist-
ing capital stock - which has reached 99.5% of its equilibrium value in t = 0 -
disappear.16 At the same time, productivity jumps to 102%, while an immedi-
ate adaptation of environmental policy accounts for that. Although the capital
stock drops only from 2487.5 to 1990.0 (−20%), the eﬀects on consumption
(−60.777%) and environmental expenditures (−62.785%) are dramatic. En-
vironmental quality falls to 43.336% of its pre-shock value. The utility level
decreases to 40.213%. Table 5.1 illustrates the percentage change of various
variables in dependence of the size of the productivity shock in t = 0.
Table 5.1: Percentage change of variables following a productiv-
ity shock and capital depreciation in t = 0 in the case of an optimal
environmental policy
∆A ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U ∆w ∆r
+2 −60.777 −62.785 −56.664 −59.787 −8.768 +14.039
+5 −67.471 −69.452 −63.329 −66.473 −6.085 +17.394
+10 −76.497 −78.351 −72.491 −75.554 −1.613 +22.984
Although production and thus the household’s income do not change very
much, consumption and environmental expenditures are slashed.17 The reason
is a jump in the savings rate from 0.014% to 77.02% in the model with optimal
constant tax and subsidy rates. Hence, the growth rate of the capital stock
jumps from 0.142% to 6.583%, 7.742% and 9.414% for an increase of productivity
of 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The consequence of such a rapid growth is
that after 15 periods 99.564% (2%-shock), 99.452% (5%-shock) and 99.256%
(10%-shock) of the new equilibrium capital stock are reached.
In contrast to the expenditures, the environmental quality as well as utility
level, the wage and the interest rate increase with an increasing productivity.
The wage rate depends on the productivity and the capital endowment. The
productivity shock nearly compensates the whole impact of capital depreciation
if it is suﬃciently large. Nevertheless, consumption is low since a high interest
rate provides incentives to save a large fraction of the income in order to build
up the new equilibrium capital stock.
16Note that the equilibrium values do not change due to capital depreciation. They are
given in Table 3.3, the percentage changes due to the shock in Table 3.5.
17Note that a distribution parameter δ = 0.5 implies in our case w = r ·a; and consequently
∆w = ∆ (r · a) = ∆y.
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The following figures display the trajectories of various variables for a pro-
ductivity shock of +2%.
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Figure 5.1: Productivity shock of 2% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0:
assets, consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
with an optimal policy
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Figure 5.2: Productivity shock of 2% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0:
growth rates of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and
utility level with anoptimal policy
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Figure 5.3: Productivity shock of 2% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0:
wage rate, interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate and capital
income with an optimal policy
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the government’s budget is again nearly bal-
anced. Over 30 periods, the budget surplus is 19.578, 21.473 and 24.399 for
shocks of 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. This is roughly above 1% of the tax
revenue.
Table 5.2: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
and change after a productivity shock and capital depreciation in
absolute values
∆A|t=0
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B ∆T |t=0 ∆S|t=0 ∆B|t=0
2% 1870.48 1850.90 19.578 −45.298 −46.837 1.539
5% 1886.66 1865.19 21.473 −50.207 −51.811 1.604
10% 1913.18 1888.78 24.399 −56.875 −58.449 1.574
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Figure 5.4: Productivity shock of 2% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0:
budget cash flow
Figure 5.5 illustrates the change of the budget cash flow after a 10% pro-
ductivity shock. Although the relative increase to the new steady state level of
environmental expenditures (+22.167%) is higher than the increase in consump-
tion (+20.490%) , the budget surplus increases even more in the first periods
after the shock. But in t = 0 the change of environmental expenditures exceeds
the change of consumption (see Table 5.1). As we could expect this is accom-
panied by a larger jump in the growth rate of environmental expenditures. The
non-monotonic change of the budget cash flow over time reflects these eﬀects
and a contrary one: Initially, the budget surplus increases due to the fact that
the tax base is reduced less than the subsidized expenditures. Later the higher
growth rates of environmental expenditures result in a decrease of the budget
surplus. Eventually, the budget is balanced in the long run.
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Figure 5.5: Productivity shock of 10% and capital depreciation of 20% in
t = 0: budget cash flow
Again we can compare the solution with the results derived for a planned
economy. Table 5.3 gives the change of variables in t = 0.
Table 5.3: Percentage change of variables following a productivity
shock and capital depreciation in t = 0 in a planned economy
∆A ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U ∆w ∆r
+2 −50.934 −53.454 −47.844 −50.179 −8.768 +14.039
+5 −56.767 −59.378 −53.533 −55.980 −6.085 +17.394
+10 −65.255 −67.899 −61.928 −64.452 −1.613 +22.984
As in previous models, the drop of expenditures is slightly less dramatic than
in an economy with constant optimal tax and subsidy rates (see Table 5.1). The
explanation is again the too high tax rate given the reduced capital stock and
thus reduced production. Wage and interest rates change in the same way as
in the model with an optimal environmental policy. The reason is that both
variables depend only on the capital endowment, productivity and exogenous
parameters. These variables are constant or change initially irrespective of the
type of regulation.
6 As Time Goes By: Delayed Adjustment of
Environmental Policy
In the previously discussed models the government was able to adjust imme-
diately tax and subsidy rates to changes of exogenous variables. This is only
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plausible if the shock is anticipated by the government - but not by the other
economic agents18 - or if the governmental power is exerted by a benevolent
dictator who can act autonomously and therefore without any delay. In real
life, however, adjustment is a bit more complicated and takes time.
Here we analyze the consequences of a delay of three periods in models with
productivity shocks and with joint productivity shocks and capital depreciation.
For illustrative purposes we also test in selected models the consequences of a
delay of ten periods - which seems rather unrealistic - and compare the results
with those of models with the faster reaction of the government.19 As in previous
sections, in t = 0 a productivity shock changed the overall productivity to 102%,
105% or 110% of the base level. In a second set this productivity shock is
accompanied by a sudden depreciation of the capital stock.20 The capital stock
that reached 99.5% of its equilibrium level of a∗ = 2500 dropped to 80% (at−0 =
2487.5, at+0 = 1990). In both sets of models households and firms adjust their
behavior to changed exogenous variables immediately. However, due to the time
consuming legislative or administrative processes the government reacts with a
delay of three periods. Subsequently households and firms adjust their behavior
again - now to the new tax and subsidy rates. For a productivity shock of
+10% with or without capital depreciation we also calculate the consequences
of a delay of ten periods as an "extreme" scenario.
The delay has no influence on the long run equilibrium values of variables.21
It aﬀects the speed of convergence - here simply defined as the time necessary to
approach a certain percentage of the equilibrium capital stock or the percentage
of the equilibrium capital stock reached in a specified term. Additionally, the
welfare of households is influenced. Here, the long-run optimal path is given
by the first-order conditions with a combination of taxes and subsidies that
guarantees a socially optimal expenditure decision of households. But in the
short run deviations from this path can result in higher welfare.22 Therefore,
the comparison of welfare in defined terms can shed light on the incentives to
adjust policy variables quickly or to react "dozily". It should be pointed out
here that the necessary change in tax and subsidy rates is rather small (see
Section 3.3).
18Anticipated shocks would not cause jumps in consumption given standard utility func-
tions; individuals would try to smooth the time path of utility and consequently of consump-
tion.
19A change of tax rates is - as compared with a change of the tax system - not so diﬃcult,
therefore three periods is an ample term.
20 It does not make sense to look at a delay in the case of a capital depreciation without
productivity shock because in our model capital depreciation alone does not require a change
of the tax or subsidy rates. The impact of capital depreciation is discussed in Section 4.
21 See tables 3.3 and 3.5.
22This is not a big surprise. It is simply a fact of every-day-politics that necessary adjust-
ments of policy instruments are postponed because they cause harms today, even if they bring
benefits tomorrow.
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6.1 The Case of a Productivity Shock
The following figures illustrate the time path of various variables after a produc-
tivity shock of 10% when the government reacts with a delay of three periods.
The short dashes indicate the hypothetical path without a shock, the very short
dashes the path without a government reaction, i.e., without adjustment of the
tax and subsidy rates.
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Figure 6.1: Productivity shock of 10% in t = 0 and 3-period delay in policy
response: assets, consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental
quality with an optimal policy
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Figure 6.2: Productivity shock of 10% in t = 0 and 3-period delay in policy
response: growth rate of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures,
and utility level with an optimal policy
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Figure 6.3: Productivity shock of 10% in t = 0 and 3-period delay in policy
response: wage rate, interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and
capital income with an optimal policy
At first glance, the trajectories after a policy adjustment do not diﬀer very
much from the hypothetical trajectories without adjusted policy instruments.
The values of control and stock variables for points in time t ≥ 5 of the models
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with lagged adjustment do not diﬀer substantially from the values with immedi-
ate adjustment. The equilibrium utility level after a shock with unadjusted and
with adjusted tax and subsidy rates is nearly the same; adjustment increases
the equilibrium utility level by 0.00000714%, 0.0000438% and 0.0001701% for
productivity shocks of 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. But there is a more
measurable diﬀerence in the expenditure structure: with adjusted policy in-
struments, consumption decreases and environmental quality increases slightly.
Table 6.1 illustrates the diﬀerences.
Table 6.1: Change of equilibrium variables due to adjustment as
percentage of values without adjustment
∆A c s N
+2% −0.0213 +0.049 +0.064
+5% −0.0526 +0.120 +0.158
+10% −0.1036 +0.235 +0.312
Although the equilibrium is nearly unaﬀected, there is a qualitative diﬀer-
ence in the path. The productivity shock increases the optimal capital stock
and therefore the equilibrium consumption. The increased consumption is ac-
companied by increased pollution. Therefore, the tax and subsidy rate should
increase, too. In t = 0, consumption is in the adjusted model lower than in the
model with a delay. Table 6.2 delivers a comparison of the initial values of both
types of models after the shock.
Table 6.2: Variables with adjustment as percentage of values with-
out adjustment after a productivity shock in t = 0
∆A c s N U
+2% 99.912 99.979 100.004 99.936
+5% 99.784 99.950 100.011 99.841
+10% 99.574 99.904 100.021 99.685
Abstaining from an immediate adjustment of the tax and subsidy rates
slightly increases the initial values of consumption and the utility level after
the shock. Integrated over 15 periods after the shock, the aggregated utility
reaches with immediate adjustment 99.988%, 99.973% and 99.954% of the ag-
gregated utility with lagged adjustment for a productivity shock of 2%, 5% and
10%, respectively. That implies gains from postponing adjustment of 0.012%,
0.027% and 0.046% of the total utility over 15 periods. The values seem to be
very small. But the aggregated total utility gain over that period due to the
productivity shock is - with a lagged policy response - only 0.828%, 2.059% and
4.073% (for a productivity shock of 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively). Compared
with the total utility gain over 15 periods, the diﬀerence between initial values
after the shock is not completely negligible. At least there is a small incentive
to postpone necessary changes in the policy variables. Nevertheless, compared
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with the absolute utility loss right after the shock, the actions of the govern-
ment have hardly any impact.23 The following table illustrates the relative size
of variable changes due to the change of the tax rate. Note that the income eﬀect
of the tax results in decreasing expenditures for consumption and the environ-
ment. However, the substitution eﬀect gives rise to an increasing environmental
quality since the cutback of consumption expenditures is relatively larger. In
addition we have the subsidy on environmental expenditures.24 Above all the
immediate utility loss due to a change of the tax rate is relatively large com-
pared to the gains in the long run.25 An only slightly myopic government will
therefore do nothing.
Table 6.3: Percentage change of variables due to a change of tax
and subsidy rates in t = 3 in the case of a productivity shock in t = 0
∆A|t=3 ∆c|t=3 ∆s|t=3 ∆N |t=3 ∆U |t=3
+2% −0.0866 −0.0205 +0.0050 −0.0639
+5% −0.2151 −0.0506 +0.0124 −0.1583
+10% −0.4228 −0.0980 +0.0249 −0.3110
A look at the government’s budget verifies this overall impression. Tax
revenue and subsidy expenditures are similar to the values in models discussed in
Section 3.26 The main diﬀerence is the second point of discontinuity at t = 3 (see
Figure 6.4). At this point the tax revenue increases and subsidy expenditures
decrease. The tax revenue changes due to the increase of the tax rate. This
compensates the decrease of the tax base (since consumption decreases at about
0.423%). Although the subsidy rate increases subsidy expenditures decrease
simply because private environmental expenditures are reduced. Therefore, the
budget cash flow increases a second time.
Table 6.4: Change of tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow
after a productivity shock in absolute values in t = 0 and after ad-
justment of the tax and subsidy rates
∆A|t=0 ∆T |t=0 ∆T |t=3 ∆S|t=0 ∆S|t=3 ∆B|t=0 ∆B|t=3
2% −6.768 +0.148 −7.120 −0.015 +0.351 +0.163
5% −16.021 +0.384 −16.788 −0.036 +0.768 +0.390
10% −29.218 +0.652 −30.435 −0.066 +1.216 +0.718
Again the budget cash flow is small and approaches zero in the long run. In
t = 15 it is 0.0094, 0.0238 and 0.0523 for a productivity shock of 2%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
23Compare the values in Table 3.4.
24Note that the decrease in expenditures corresponds to the positive budget cash flow in
Figure 6.4.
25 See Section 3.3.
26 See Table 3.7.
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Table 6.5: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
after a productivity shock in t = 0 in absolute values
∆A|t=0
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B
2% 2050.48 2038.84 11.637
5% 2068.76 2055.01 13.746
10% 2099.24 2082.09 17.162
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Figure 6.4: Productivity shock of 10% in t = 0 and 3-period delay in policy
response: budget cash flow
To verify the impression we calculate an "extreme" scenario with a shock of
10% and a policy response delay of ten periods. Again, the aggregated utility
levels are lower if the optimal tax and subsidy rates are introduced immediately
after the shock. A simple explanation is that the strong and fast action of the
government creates an overshooting eﬀect in t = 0. Compared with the actual
external eﬀect, the tax rate at this point is just too high. An optimal path is
characterized by a smooth adjustment of tax and subsidy rates. But this is a
very unlikely scenario since its transaction costs are prohibitively high. Overall,
the impact of the way and speed of adjustment on welfare is - compared with
the eﬀect of the introduction of environmental policy - in the present model
astonishingly small.
6.2 The Case of a Productivity Shock and Capital Depre-
ciation
As in the previous set of models, the changes of equilibrium variables due to the
adjustment of the policy instruments are very small. The percentage changes
of equilibrium variables due to changes of tax and subsidy rates are equal to
38
the values given in Table 6.1 since equilibrium values are unaﬀected by the
depreciation of capital.
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Figure 6.5: Productivity shock of 10% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0
and 3-period delay in policy response: assets, consumption, environmental
expenditures and environmental quality with an optimal policy
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Figure 6.6: Productivity shock of 10% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0
and 3-period delay in policy response: growth rate of assets, consumption and
environmental expenditures, and utility level with an optimal policy
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Figure 6.7: Productivity shock of 10% and capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0
and 3-period delay in policy response: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income with an optimal policy
Again, we can compare the variables in the case of an immediate adjustment
with the case of a delay in the political response. As can be seen in Table 6.6
the values are very similar to the case of the mere productivity shock.
Table 6.6: Variables with adjustment as percentage of values with-
out adjustment after productivity shock in t = 0
∆A c s N U
+2% 99.911 99.884 100.003 99.934
+5% 99.780 99.953 100.007 99.837
+10% 99.565 99.910 100.016 99.677
Integrated over 15 periods the utility gains from postponing changes of tax
and subsidy rates are here 0.0082%, 0.0180% and 0.0289% for productivity
shocks of 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Hence, a sudden depreciation of the
capital stock slightly reduces the incentives to abstain from necessary changes
of the tax and subsidy rates.
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Table 6.7: Percentage change of variables due to a change of tax
and subsidy rates in t = 3 in the case of a productivity shock and
capital depreciation in t = 0
∆A|t=3 ∆c|t=3 ∆s|t=3 ∆N |t=3 ∆U |t=3
+2% −0.0877 −0.0201 +0.0040 −0.0648
+5% −0.2170 −0.0494 +0.0104 −0.1603
+10% −0.4269 −0.0951 +0.0204 −0.3152
Once again, the income eﬀect of the tax results in decreasing expenditures
for all purposes, but the substitution eﬀect and the subsidy imply an increasing
environmental quality due to a change in the expenditure structure. The pattern
of the changes of tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow is similar to
the pattern in the model without capital depreciation (see Table 6.4) with the
exception of an increased magnitude of all changes in t = 0 due to the more
severe cuts in the individuals’ expenditures.
Table 6.8: Change of tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow
after a productivity shock and capital depreciation in t = 0 in absolute
values and after adjustment of the tax and subsidy rates
∆A|t=0 ∆T |t=0 ∆T |t=3 ∆S|t=0 ∆S|t=3 ∆B|t=0 ∆B|t=3
2% −45.356 +0.102 −46.831 −0.010 +1.476 +0.112
5% −50.326 +0.239 −51.800 −0.023 +1.474 +0.262
10% −57.043 +0.424 −58.434 −0.041 +1.392 +0.464
Compared with the model without capital depreciation, in t = 0 the tax
revenues and expenditures for subsidies over time are lower. This is caused
by the cutback in individual expenditures following a capital depreciation in
t = 0. Again, the budget cash flow approaches zero in the long run; in t = 15
it is 0.0633, 0.0843 and 0.1256 for a productivity shock of 2%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
Table 6.9: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
after a productivity shock and capital depreciation in t = 0 in absolute
values
∆A|t=0
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B
2% 1870.24 1850.92 19.312
5% 1886.12 1865.23 20.883
10% 1912.29 1888.85 23.441
Figure 6.8 illustrates the budget cash flow in the case of a productivity shock
of 10% and a capital depreciation of 20% in t = 0. Similar to Figure 5.5, the
budget surplus increases in the first periods after t = 0. In t = 3 the second
discontinuity caused by the adjustment of the tax and subsidy rates is visible.
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Figure 6.8: Productivity shock of 10% and capital depreciation in t = 0 and
3-period delay in the policy response: budget cash flow
7 Summary
We have examined the impact of productivity shocks and a sudden capital
depreciation in a dynamic model in which pollution is modeled as a side eﬀect
of consumption. As reference points we have calculated the planner’s solution
and the outcome of an unregulated economy. The government takes care of
the externalities by using two instruments. The negative externality caused
by pollution is internalized by a tax on consumption, the positive externality
generated by environmental expenditures is internalized via a subsidy on these
expenditures. To keep things simple - and transaction costs low - we have
assumed that tax and subsidy rates are fixed at the optimal level: the level that
guarantees an optimal expenditure structure and a balanced government budget
in the long-run equilibrium.27 Additionally we have analyzed the consequences
of delays in the response of the government after exogenous shocks - jumps in
the productivity and sudden capital depreciation.
A productivity shock results in an increased equilibrium asset level. Con-
sequently, consumption and environmental expenditures - and as a result envi-
ronmental quality itself - decrease initially to provide resources to elevate the
actual capital stock. The planned economy diﬀers from the unregulated market
and from an economy regulated by an optimal policy as described above. With
an optimal policy, the decline of consumption and as a consequence the fall of
the utility level is most drastic. Simultaneously the speed of convergence to the
27Deviations from optimal tax and subsidy rates are discussed in Barthel (2005).
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new equilibrium is the highest. An unregulated economy reacts with the lowest
decline of consumption and hence needs the longest term to converge to the
new steady state. The initial change of variables in a planned economy is more
prominent than in the market solution since the planner takes positive external-
ities of a reduced consumption on other households into account. The regime
of constant tax and subsidy rates causes an even stronger shift of the variable
values due to the fact that with a reduced output - and therefore consumption
- the tax is too high. But a permanent adjustment of tax and subsidy rates
would create prohibitively high transaction costs. Consequently we stick to this
part of the model.
Sudden capital depreciation of a certain dimension results in a much more se-
vere fall of consumption and environmental expenditures, and as a consequence
of the utility level. Again, the reduction of consumption and, as a result, the
speed of convergence is higher in the model with an optimal environmental pol-
icy. In an unregulated economy, the drop of the expenditures for environmental
quality is unequal to that of consumption, whereas in a planned economy or
with an optimal policy the reductions of both types of expenditures are very
much alike.
In combination, a productivity shock and sudden capital depreciation have
dramatic eﬀects. In the case of an optimal environmental policy, a capital de-
preciation of 20% and a simultaneous productivity shock of 10% lead - although
the wage rate decreases only by about 1.6% - to a drop of the utility level to
24.4%. At the same time, savings and interest rates as well as all growth rates
jump up. Once again we can observe a higher speed of convergence in models
with optimal policy than in a planned economy, caused by a more severe initial
fall of expenditures due to a too high tax rate given the reduced consumption
and therefore a higher savings rate.
An immediate adjustment of the tax and subsidy rates is not possible in
the real world. Therefore, we have analyzed the consequences of a delay in
the reaction of the government caused by the time necessary to change the tax
and subsidy rates in a democratic system. For simplicity, we have assumed a
delay of three periods (with a few exceptions). The delay does not influence the
equilibrium values of variables but the trajectories towards these equilibria.
The first proposition is that in the models presented the necessary adjust-
ments are very small, thus their impact will be rather small, too. Adjusting
the regulative system has a very small influence on the utility level. In the long
run, small gains due to a change in the tax and subsidy rates can be expected.
But in the short run, there are incentives to abstain from adjustment. These
incentives are small compared to the initial change in the utility level but not
completely negligible if we take the size of the aggregated utility gain due to
the productivity shock over 15 periods into account. Therefore an only slightly
myopic government will not adjust the tax and subsidy rates, especially if this
causes additional transaction costs.
If the productivity shock is accompanied by a sudden capital depreciation,
the equilibrium values - and therefore the gains from adjustment of the regula-
tion measure - do not change but so do the trajectories to the equilibrium. The
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utility gains from postponing the adjustment, aggregated over the 15 periods,
are slightly reduced. Nevertheless, they remain positive.
Last but not least we have to emphasize that all models converge to a budget
cash flow of zero in the long run. Productivity shocks, capital depreciation and
also the adjustment of the tax system lead to discontinuities with a budget
surplus.
The present model deals with - from the household’s point of view - exoge-
nous changes in the economic system. Since the household is the polluter in this
setting28 it would be interesting to look at changes in the household’s preference
structure. But this will be left open for future research.
28Here: in a physical sense. And, yes, I know the Coase theorem.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Solution of the Household’s Optimization Problem in
the Basic Model
The Hamiltonian for the household i is:
JH = U
¡
ci, N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
+ θ(a) ·
¡
r · a+ w − ci − s(N)i
¢
(28)
The first-order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂ci = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = θ(a) (29)
2. ∂J∂s(N)i
= 0
UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a) (30)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · r (31)
The transversality condition29 is given by:
lim
t→∞
£
θ(a) · a
¤
= 0
which is equivalent to:
lim
t→∞
£
e−ρ·t · a¤ = 0
From the Conditions (29) and (30) we can derive:
Uc = UN · (NE ·ES −NP · PC)
After derivation of the Conditions (29) and (30) with respect to time follows:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ3 · c˙+ ξ4 · s˙
with
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN · n ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UcN · PC ·NP · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡
(UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS ·NE + UNN ·E2S ·N2E + UN ·E2S ·NEE
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
29 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 503-508.
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Therefore, the control variables change according to:
c˙ =
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ3 · ξ2
· (ρ− r) (32)
s˙ =
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· (ρ− r) (33)
8.2 Solution of the Planner’s Optimization Problem
The Hamiltonian can now be written as:
JP = U
¡
c,N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
+ θ(a) ·
¡
f (a)− c− s(N)
¢
(34)
The first-order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂c = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC · n = θ(a) (35)
2. ∂J∂s(N) = 0
UN ·NE ·ES · n = θ(a) (36)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · fa (37)
From Equations (35) and (36) follows:
Uc = UN · n · (NE ·ES −NP · PC)
After derivation of Conditions (35) and (36) with respect to time we arrive at:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ2 · c˙+ ξ3 · s˙
with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
∙
UN ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UNN ·N2P · P 2C
¸
· n2 + 2 · UcN · PC ·NP · n
UN ·NE ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN + UNN ·NP · PC · n
UN
+
NEP · PC · n
NE
ξ3 ≡
UNN ·NE ·ES · n
UN
+
NEE ·ES · n
NE
+
ESS · n
ES
It follows
ρ− fa = ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ2 · c˙+ ξ3 · s˙
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Here, the growth rates are given by:
a˙ = f (a)− c− s(N) (38)
c˙ =
ξ2 − ξ3
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· (ρ− fa) (39)
s˙ =
ξ2 − ξ1
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· (ρ− fa) (40)
Using the assumed specifications the short-hand equations simplify to:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
¡
UNN · P 2C − UN · PCC
¢ · n2 − 2 · UcN · PC · n
UN ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN − UNN · PC · n
UN
ξ3 ≡
UNN ·E2S + UN ·ESS
UN ·ES · n
8.3 Solution of the Household’s Optimization Problemwith
Repayment of Tax Revenues as a Subsidy
The Hamiltonian for the household i is:
JH = U
¡
ci, N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
(41)
+θ(a) ·
¡
r · ai + wi − (1 + d) · ci − (1− p) · s(N)i
¢
The first-order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂ci = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = θ(a) · (1 + d) (42)
2. ∂J∂s(N)i
= 0
UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a) · (1− p) (43)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · r (44)
Again, we can derive:
Uc = UN ·
µ
1 + d
1− p ·NE ·ES −NP · PC
¶
From the derivation of Conditions (42) and (43) with respect to time follows:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙+ ξ3 · d˙
= ξ4 · c˙+ ξ5 · s˙+ ξ6 · p˙
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with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN · n ·
¡
NP · PCC +NPP · P 2C
¢
+UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n+ UcN ·NP · PC · (n+ 1)
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡ −
1
1 + d
ξ4 ≡
(UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ5 ≡
¡
UN ·NE ·ESS + UNN ·N2E ·E2S + UN ·NEE ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ6 ≡
1
1− p
This can be rewritten to:
c˙ =
(ξ5 − ξ2) · (ρ− r)− ξ3 · ξ5 · d˙+ ξ2 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
s˙ =
(ξ1 − ξ4) · (ρ− r) + ξ3 · ξ4 · d˙− ξ1 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
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